Introduction
In May 2002, the B.C. government introduced Bill 48, the Employment Standards Amendment Act which contained a broad union derogation provision that would allegedly enable both workers and employers to benefit from increased workplace “flexibility” by providing “opt out” provisions for unionized employees from the core minimum legal standards mandated by the B.C. Employment Standards Act. In reality, however, according to a recent study by the Canadian Centre of Policy Alternatives, the effect of Bill 48, by eliminating the “meet or exceed provisions” has been to strip unionized workers of their basic rights enshrined in the ESA and has resulted in substandard working conditions and, potentially, a future Charter challenge.
The Provenance of Bill 48
The predecessor of Bill 48 can be found in Social Credit party Premier Bill Bennett’s controversial amendment to the B.C. Employment Standards Act (hereinafter “ESA”) in 1983 which excluded unionized workers from the core protections of the ESA. Although Bennett’s 1983 amendment was repealed by the NDP government in 1992, employer organizations lobbied strenuously in favour of retention of the provision, arguing that parties to collective bargaining should have the right to create their own resolutions to issues covered by the Employment Standards Act, unhampered by legislated legal minimum standards. The following years saw a concerted effort by two major employer organizations, the coalition of B.C. Businesses and the Business Council of B.C., to pressure the government to make changes to the ESA, relying on a policy document which asserted that government-mandated basic workplace standards protecting employees “should not preclude employees and employers from agreeing to variations on those standards to meet their mutual interests”.
In a 2001 submission to Gordon Campbell’s Liberal government, the Business Council of B.C. called for a reinstatement of the 1983 exclusionary provision, arguing that “employment standards should not interfere with the daily operations of unionized worksites”. Following a consultation process in which the respondents, when asked whether workers covered by collective agreements should be protected by the ESA, were given only the options advanced by business associations and were granted merely twenty-eight days to reply, all employer organizations, predictably, supported some form of exclusion of unionized workers from the ESA, while all unions opposed any such exclusion. In spite of this opposition from unions, from workers’ rights groups and from such notable public figures as the 1993 Employment Standards Review Commissioner Mark Thompson who in a letter to the Assistant Deputy Minister of Skills Development and Labour, said that such an exclusionary policy was unwise “because it opens the door to corrupt arrangements between employers and pseudo unions… [which] now exist in BC”, Bill 48 was introduced in May 2002 and passed in the BC legislature, incorporating language that actually expanded the scope of the collective agreement exclusions from the original 1983 provision.
Bill 48: Opting Out of Legal Minima
For eight years, from 1994 to 2002, employees covered by a collective agreement were deemed to have rights and benefits at least equal to those in the Employment Standards Act, regardless of the scope of the governing collective agreement: the “meet or exceed” provisions. After the passage of Bill 48, however, in a feature of employment law unique in Canada, parties to a collective agreement could “opt out” of the legal protections of the Act and agree to conditions of employment below or contrary to what all other workers are required to receive by law, if their collective agreements contain any language regarding the specific provisions. Such provisions include those concerning hours of work and overtime, statutory holidays, annual vacations or vacation pay, paydays, termination of employment and layoff, termination pay and payroll records. Initially, one might presume that such exclusion is immaterial because employees covered by a collective agreement have recourse to the union for protection, and that the existing collective agreement contains provisions well above the minimum standards prescribed in the ESA. Fairey and McCallum, however, in “Negotiating Without a Floor: Unionized Worker Exclusion from BC Employment Standards”, articulate four compelling reasons why all workers, including unionized employees, should have access to the protections afforded by the ESA which bear mention.
Reasons ESA Protections are Important to Unionized Workers
1) Bill 48 Denies Unionized Employees the Protections of Government Enforcement of the Law
Prior to the passage of Bill 48, employees covered by a collective agreement could grieve any provision in the agreement which fell below any ESA minimum and have the provision declared illegal. Now, unionized workers no longer have recourse to the any of the wage recovery mechanisms of the ESA, the powers of enforcement of the Employment Standards Branch or the grievance procedure through the Labour Relations Board.
2) Unions Must “Re-Win” Basic Rights
The Employment Standards Act sets out minimum workplace protections and benefits which bind employers regarding issues such as minimum wage, minimum and maximum hours of work, overtime pay and statutory holidays. Such standards are meant to provide a basis for negotiation of improved conditions during collective bargaining between unions and employers. With the advent of Bill 48, however, because unions have been excluded from the minimum standards stipulated in the ESA, unions have been compelled to allocate time and resources battling for the basic rights that other workers possess automatically, rather than focusing on improving working conditions for union members.
3) Employers Exploiting Lacunae in Collective Agreements
Because many collective agreements don’t cover every issue dealt with in the Employment Standards Act, prior to Bill 48, when an agreement was silent on an issue, the ESA minima were deemed to apply. Now, in the absence of this default application of the ESA and as a result of the failure of the B.C. government to allow unions to re-open their collective agreements for revision prior to the passage of Bill 48, some employers are taking advantage of lacunae in collective agreements to deny workers the minimum ESA protections. Indeed, any collective agreement in effect as of May 2002 that contained “any provision” whatsoever, regardless of whether it was substandard or contained a glaring omission was, by Bill 48, legislated into an exclusion status without recourse. A particularly egregious example of the application of this principle is an October 2005 decision cited by Fairey and McCallum in which a laid-off Steelworker was denied a grievance against the employer for not providing eight weeks wages in lieu of notice of termination pursuant to the ESA because the collective agreement provided only for severance in the event of a plant closure. The arbitrator found that because the agreement contained specific language providing for the payment of severance (in spite of the fact it was limited to situations of plant closure) and the ESA, in section 3(2) contained a provision regarding “termination of employment” no differentiation between “severance pay” and “termination pay” was necessary. The minimum standards for terminations or layoffs in the ESA didn’t apply because the collective agreement “addressed” a subject set out in Section 3(2) of the ESA.
4) Collaboration Between Employer and “Alternative” Employer-Accommodating Unions
When the ESA prohibited contracting out of its provisions from 1994 to 2001, applying pressure on unions during collective bargaining to accept working conditions lower than the minimum standards or forcing a union to strike over employer demands for substandard provisions would have been an “unfair labour practice”. Now, employees working under a substandard agreement no longer have such recourse. Further, as Professor Thompson warned, Bill 48 created incentive for employers to seek out and certify unions which will “opt out” of the legal protections of the ESA and agree to substandard conditions of employment.
With reference to BC’s largest “employer accommodating union”, the Christian Labour Association of Canada, Fairey and McCallum found that of the thirty-two CLAC agreements negotiated after Bill 48, twenty-eight contained at least one substandard condition relative to the core provisions of the new ESA. In one notable instance, a Letter of Understanding between JJM Construction Ltd and CLAC Local 67, employees’ regular rates of pay were reduced by twenty percent for work in excess of 40 hours per week and on weekends and holidays before overtime rates apply, while the Employment Standards Act would have required the premium paid to be based on the employees’ regular rates and pay: JJM Construction’s agreement with the extremely “cooperative” CLAC clearly violated the ESA as the overtime rates of pay are 20% less than they would have been under the legal minima mandated by the ESA.
Conclusion
It is interesting to note that in 1996, Ontario attempted to introduce a similar piece of legislation (Bill 49) which would have allowed employer and unions to negotiate their own employment standards as part of the Harris government’s policy to increase labour market “flexibility”. Bill 49 was quickly withdrawn after a coalition of unions, workers’ rights advocates and legal clinics (the “Employment Standards Working Group”) managed to draw attention and opposition to the Harris government proposal. British Columbia, unfortunately, did not have the benefit of this widespread public opposition to Bill 48 and unionized workers are now suffering the consequences of the inequitable, arbitrary initiative which promotes corrupt arrangements between employers and “employer-influenced” unions and deprives unionized workers of the basic rights that should be (and once were) guaranteed to all employees.
I agree with Fairey and McCallum’s recommendation that section 3(2) of the Employment Standards Amendment Act excluding unionized workers from core provisions of the ESA be repealed, and the “meet or exceed” provisions of the 1994-2001 Act be returned so as to ensure that any lacunae in collective agreements may be filled by recourse to the Employment Standards Act. Further, the Employment Standards Branch should assume its previous role in scrutinizing collective agreements, thereby granting unionized employees access to effective enforcement measures.
Random Drug and Alcohol Testing: The Latest
Published January 13, 2010 Cases , Commentary , Human Rights , Labour Leave a CommentWe are pleased to share a guest blog entry on the subject of random drug and alcohol testing, written by Katia Diab. Katia is a second year student at Osgoode and has prior experience in the field having worked with CLASP, the Centre for Equality Rights in Accommodation (CERA), and the Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF).
We encourage more students to submit guest blog entries – it’s a fantastic talking point during interviews and really helps get your name out there, so e-mail us if you have an idea!
Introduction
The rights and obligations of both employers and employees with respect to drug and alcohol testing in Canada remains a controversial issue. While the first reported case regarding drug testing in the workplace was heard more than 20 years ago in Re Canadian Pacific Ltd. and United Transportation Union, (1987) 31 L.A.C (3d) 179, there is still a significant amount of debate. In particular, ambiguity still looms with respect to random drug and alcohol testing and under what circumstances it is permitted by employers.
The Issue
The primary obstacle in deciphering how the law on random alcohol and drug testing in the workplace should be applied is achieving an appropriate balance; that is, a balance between management rights and obligations in maintaining a safe and productive work environment, while also protecting employee rights to dignity, privacy and accommodation. The law over the past decade seems to suggest that while random alcohol testing for safety-sensitive positions is permissible under certain circumstances, random drug testing for those same positions is not. The case law provides some context as to why these distinctions are drawn, however, some uncertainty remains in this area of the law causing confusion for both employees and employers.
Evolution of the Law
Entrop v. Imperial Oil Limited, 2000 CanLII 16800 (ON C.A) (“Entrop”)
Entrop v. Imperial Oil Limited is one of the earlier cases that dealt comprehensively with the issue of random alcohol and drug testing in the workplace for safety-sensitive positions. The case was originally arbitrated in 1992 and found its way to the Ontario Court of Appeal in 2000. The facts revolved around an alcohol and drug policy instituted by Imperial Oil as part of its health and safety plan; among other things, the plan called for random testing using breathalyzers to test for alcohol use and urinalysis to test for drug use. The random testing provisions of the policy were challenged under the Human Rights Code (HRC) by an employee, Entrop, who was a recovering alcoholic. Entrop claimed the policy discriminated against people with alcohol dependence and are considered disabled according to relevant legislation. At the time the provisions of the policy were challenged, there was no collective agreement in place at Imperial Oil.
Ultimately, the Ontario Court of Appeal found that while random alcohol testing is prima facie discriminatory it can be justified as a bona fide occupational requirement (BFOR) providing that the repercussions of the test were tailored to individual circumstances and that the employer met his or her duty to accommodate to the point of undue hardship. However, with respect to random drug testing, the Court came to an alternative conclusion. Although not a direct issue in the case, the Court ruled that random drug testing is not permissible. The reasons given to justify the allowance of alcohol testing and the prohibition of drug testing revolved primarily around the two methods used for testing; while the breathalyzer could give an immediate reading on impairment, the urinalysis test could not. Therefore, there was no accurate way to measure the effect of drug use on job performance and so the testing could not be justified as a BFOR.
Imperial Oil Limited v. Communications, Energy & Paperworks Union of Canada, Local 900, 2009 ONCA 420 (“Imperial Oil”)
In reaction to the decision in Entrop, in 2003 Imperial Oil instituted random drug testing using a new method geared towards detecting immediate impairment. After consultation with experts, the company replaced urinalysis with oral fluid (saliva) testing. At this point the plant had become unionized. As a result, the union filed a grievance challenging the new drug testing under the collective agreement and not under the HRC as was the case in Entrop. The final judgment in the case was given by the Ontario Court of Appeal.
The Court affirmed the arbitration board’s decision in some respects, thereby clarifying certain aspects of the law. The decision in Imperial Oil stands as a strong pronouncement against both random alcohol and random drug testing. Namely, the Court affirmed that random testing in safety sensitive positions was not an implied right for management.
The law can be summarized as follows: an employee can only be subjected to random, unannounced alcohol or drug testing as part of an agreed rehabilitative program or where the facts give the employer reasonable cause to do so. Moreover, the employer has the right under a collective agreement to require such testing after a significant incident or accident, whereby it is imperative to identify the underlying reasons for such an event. Continuing testing may also be appropriate for individuals found to have substance abuse problems; however, management does not have untrammeled rights in such a case as there must be a time limit imposed on continued testing and the employee’s union must be involved in the creation of terms and conditions. While jurisprudence recognizes the need for safety and deterrence, management rights are limited with respect to random testing in order to protect the dignity and privacy of employees.
In dealing specifically with the issue at hand and despite the new method of drug testing, Imperial Oil was held to have violated its collective agreement with the new policy. With a view to balancing employer and employee interests under the collective agreement, the Court once again distinguished Imperial Oil’s method of alcohol testing with the use of the breathalyzer from its drug testing. Whereas the breathalyzer is minimally intrusive and provides immediate results, the drug testing methods employed inImperial Oil involving saliva swabs are more cumbersome, invasive and take several days to process. Thus drug testing methods were deemed to violate employee rights to dignity and privacy.
Petro-Canada Lubricants Centre (Mississauga) v. CEP, Local 593, 2009 CanLII 44405 (ON C.A) (“Petro-Canada”)
In the most recent arbitrated case dealing with these issues, Arbitrator Kaplan held that an employer was in breach of its collective agreement when it implemented random alcohol testing for safety-sensitive positions. In supporting his decision, Kaplan relied heavily on the analysis in Imperial Oil and its strong stance against random testing. Although the decision makes no mention of the particular case, it stands in contrast to Entrop where random alcohol testing for safety sensitive positions was seen as BFOR.
Current Law and Outstanding Issues
In light of the most recent case law, it appears as though Imperial Oil stands as the most authoritative pronouncement on the law of random alcohol and drug testing. While Imperial Oil comes down strongly against all randomized testing, except under specific circumstances as mentioned above, random drug testing remains the more controversial issue. It is also evident that the Court of Appeal decision in Imperial Oil on which Petro-Canada relies is somewhat at odds with the Court of Appeal decision in Entrop.
How can these decisions be reconciled? While the Court of Appeal in upholding Imperial Oil does not directly address their seemingly inconsistent decisions, supporting the denunciation of random drug testing in one case and allowing random alcohol testing in another, it does make mention of some distinctions pointed out by Arbitrator Picher’s analysis in Imperial Oil. In his decision, Picher distinguishes Entrop from Imperial Oil primarily on the grounds that Entrop “did not involve the interpretation, application or administration of the terms of a collective agreement” (Imperial Oil, para. 72), but rather dealt with an HRC claim. Significantly, Picher also emphasizes the fact that random alcohol testing was permitted in Entrop primarily because of the method used for testing.
Implications
The arguments used to distinguish Entrop and Imperial Oil lead us to certain conclusions and certain questions. For one, they can be seen as a reaffirmation of the importance of collective agreements in protecting certain employee rights: in both Imperial Oil and Petro-Canada where a collective agreement was at issue, the employees were protected to a greater extent than in Entrop where a non-unionized workplace policy was at issue. As Picher explains, “it is important to remember that that which is permissible under human rights legislation may not be permissible under collective agreements” (Imperial Oil, para. 110). Further however, the distinctions leave the question regarding the permissibility of random drug testing in unionized environments slightly open: if alcohol testing is permitted due to the manner used to test an individual, what if a new method of random drug testing, reflecting similar characteristics, is developed and employed?